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Expanding the Rights of Recording
Artists
AN ARGUMENT TO REPEAL SECTION 2855(b) OF
THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
I.

INTRODUCTION
You’re a nineteen-year-old dropout without a nickel to your name.
No car, no job, no credit. Your gigs at CBGB don’t even cover the
rent for your studio in Alphabet City. Who in their right mind would
hand you $750,000? Welcome to the record business, where giant
corporations risk more than $1 billion each year on young, untested
musicians whose careers typically crash and burn.1

Any recording artist who hopes to have his music played
on radios across the world has little choice but to sign with a
major label.2 Four companies, Universal, Sony BMG, EMI, and
Warner Music, have acquired vertical and horizontal control
over almost every aspect of the industry.3 These record
1
Adaptation based on Chuck Philips, Record Label Chorus: High Risk, Low
Margin; Music: With Stars Questioning their Deals, the Big Companies Make their Case
with Numbers, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 10516413
[hereinafter Philips, Record Label Chorus].
2
The fact that “most recording [artists] who have the opportunity to exit the
major label system typically re-sign with [another] major label” indicates the necessity
of signing with one of the Big Four. Id. (quoting Hilary Rosen, President of the
Recording Industry Association of America).
3
These record companies control over seventy-five percent of the worldwide
music sales. Jack Bishop, Building International Empires of Sound: Concentrations of
Power and Property in the “Global” Music Market, 28 POPULAR MUSIC & SOC’Y 443, 443
(2005) (discussing “how the world’s media giants use their power and property to
influence national and international laws in order to lock down culture and control
creativity”).
Throughout the late 1970s and until the late 1990s, six major record
companies, Warner, EMI, RCA/BMG, Polygram, MCA/Universal, and Sony, reaped
virtually all the profits of the music industry, owned the major labels, and held the
most profitable artists. Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Good-Bye to
Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should be Put to
Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 301 n.114 (2001) (suggesting the possibility
that “monopolistic practices [will] plague the music industry in the near future due to
large corporate mergers”). After the purchase of Polygram by Universal and the
merger of Sony and BMG, the major six became four. See David Lieberman, Lack is
Determined to be More than a Music Man, USA TODAY, June 13, 2005, at 1B, available
at 2005 WLNR 9342352.
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companies, the “Big Four,” control manufacturing, distribution,
retailing, shelf space, record clubs, and digital delivery, not
only in the United States, but also in all markets worldwide.4
The Big Four specialize in marketing and promoting records to
mass audiences, and they have the capital to take huge
financial risks to advance an artist.5 Furthermore, only a few
media companies control most of the nation’s radio stations,6
making it that much more difficult for an artist to get her
music on the air without the backing of one of the major labels.7
Recording artists describe the standard Big Four
agreements as “unconscionable,” “indentured servitudes,” and
“impossible”8 because of the control these contracts give the
Recording
record company over the artists’ careers.9
Even though the discussions of an EMI/Warner Music merger have been
put to a halt since the the European Court of First Instance in Luxembourg overturned
regulatory approval of the 2004 merger of the music units of Sony and Bertelsmann,
the possibility remains that the four could soon become three. See Andrew Ross Sorkin
and Jennny Anderson, Descision on Bids for BMG Music Unit Could Be Imminent, NY
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file; Dan
Milmo, Analysts Play Matchmaker to EMI and Warner: The Week Ahead, GUARDIAN
(UK), Nov. 14, 2005, at 29, available at LEXIS News Library, UKPAPR file.
4
See Bishop, supra note 3 (“Today’s music business is in the hands of megacorporations, which also control TV, radio, publishing, electronics manufacturing, and
global communications networks.”).
5
See Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1.
6
Kathleen Sharp, Recording Artists Sue, Aiming to Rock Industry Action
Expected to Put Big Labels Under Scrutiny, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2001, at A6,
available at 2001 WLNR 5521579. After the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, the limitations controlling national ownership of radio stations were eliminated.
Consequently, radio companies could control much larger segments of the airwaves.
See Zeb G. Schorr, Note, The Future of Online Music: Balancing the Interests of Labels,
Artists, and the Public, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67, 85 (2003).
7
Sharp, supra note 6.
8
See Omar Anorga, Note, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the
Key of Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 739, 739, 754-73 (2003); Connie Chang,
Note, Can’t Record Labels and Recording Artists All Just Get Along?: The Debate Over
California Labor Code § 2855 and it’s Impact on the Music Industry, 12 DEPAUL-LCA
J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 13, 13 (2002); Sharp, supra note 6.
9
Chuck Philips, Courtney Love Seeks to Rock Record Labels’ Contract Policy;
Music: Suit Challenges Universal’s Royalty Practices; Firm Says it is Fair, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 10498258 [hereinafter Philips, Courtney
Love]. One prominent artist, Courtney Love, asserts that
the primary reason the [Big Four] record conglomerates have been able to
call the shots for so long is that they control nearly 90% of the music sold
throughout the world. They operate the label system under which most
music is recorded, manufactured, marketed, promoted and distributed to
radio, MTV and retail outlets.
Id.
Various other recording artists, such as Don Henley, Patti Austin, and
LeAnn Rimes, argue that record contracts are unfair. See Bill Holland, Performers
Give Testimony Before Judges and Lawmakers—Record Labels, Artists at Loggerheads
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agreements contain various clauses and provisions that are
usually non-negotiable.10 One of the foremost reasons for
dissension between recording artists and record companies is
the duration of a standard recording contract.11 In most
instances, a musician signing a contract for the first time is
expected to deliver five to seven albums.12 Under the standard
recording agreement, artists must deliver an album every nine
to eighteen months.13 While in theory an artist could deliver
seven albums in seven years (if an album is actually delivered
every nine to twelve months), standard recording industry
practices preclude this possibility.14 “[R]ecord companies have
preferred and often insisted on a minimum two-year gap
between releases for . . . artists.”15 This typical two-year time
span between album releases substantially increases the
length of the term of the agreement.

Over Contracts, BILLBOARD, Sept. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 8736669
[hereinafter Holland, Performers Give Testimony]; Melinda Newman, Battle Lines
Drawn Over Seven-Year Statute, BILLBOARD, Sept. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR
8717304; Chuck Philips, Recording Stars Challenge Music Labels’ Business Practices,
L.A. TIMES, March 29, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 10504302 [hereinafter
Philips, Recording Stars Challenge] (“Singer-songwriter Don Henley, co-founder of the
Recording Artists coalition, which represents dozens of stars, including Eric Clapton,
Joni Mitchell, Q-Tip and Peggy Lee, said: ‘Record companies have been screwing artists
for ages. It’s time we organize and fight back.’”).
10
Such provisions include: the recoupment clause, the work-for-hire clause,
the controlled composition clause, discounted royalties for foreign and record-club
sales, “phony” free goods clauses, cross-collateralization clauses, packaging royalty
deductions, “breakage” royalty deductions, and new technology royalty deductions. See
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. For further discussion on these
provisions, see infra Part III.A.
11
See Note, California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’
Contracts, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2632, 2633-34 (2003) (“Section 2855 has been an
important aspect of almost every significant dispute between a recording artist and a
major record company during the last decade.”).
12
DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS
100 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter PASSMAN, 5th ed.] (Labels “insist on the right to get a
total of five to seven albums over the course of the deal.”).
13
See Cross Complaint at 6, Love v. Geffen Records, Inc., No. BC 223364
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Love Cross Complaint] (“For example,
the [Hole contract] provided for a standard delivery schedule, i.e., for a master
recording no later than every approximately 18 months.”).
14
Chang, supra note 8, at 16-17.
15
Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 6.
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California Labor Code section 285516 is the most
significant law impacting the duration of a recording
agreement,17 and it has often been the focus of tension between
artists and record labels.18 Under section 2855, “professional
service providers, including actors and sports figures, are not
required to remain under contract for their services for more
16

The statute states, in relevant part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), a contract to render
personal service . . . may not be enforced against the employee beyond seven
years from the commencement of service under it. Any contract, otherwise
valid, to perform or render service of a special, unique, unusual,
extraordinary, or intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value and the
loss of which can not be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in
an action at law, may nevertheless be enforced against the person contracting
to render the service, for a term not to exceed seven years from the
commencement of service under it. If the employee voluntarily continues to
serve under it beyond that time, the contract may be referred to as affording
a presumptive measure of the compensation.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a):
(1) Any employee who is a party to a contract to render personal
service in the production of phonorecords . . . may not invoke the
provisions of subdivision (a) without first giving written notice to
the employer . . . specifying that the employee from and after a
future date certain specified in the notice will no longer render
service under the contract by reason of subdivision(a).
(2) Any party to such a contract shall have the right to recover
damages for a breach of the contract occurring during its term in an
action commenced during or after its term, but within the
applicable
period
prescribed
by
law.
(3) In the event a party to such a contract is, or could
contractually be, required to render personal service in the
production of a specified quantity of the phonorecords and fails to
render all of the required service prior to the date specified in the
notice provided in paragraph (1), the party damaged by the failure
shall have the right to recover damages for each phonorecord as to
which that party has failed to render service in an action which,
notwithstanding paragraph (2), shall be commenced within 45 days
after the date specified in the notice.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2005).
17
“Section 2855(b) of the California Labor code provides an exception for
recording contracts which serves to virtually remove any limits on their length.” Sen.
Kevin Murray, Recording Industry Practices, available at http://democrats.sen.ca.gov/
articlefiles/985-Recording%20Industry%20Practices.pdf
[hereinafter
Recording
Industry Practices] (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
18
Nicholas Baumgartner, The Balance Between Recording Artists and Record
Companies: A Tip in Favor of the Artists?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 73, 77 (2003)
(“The decades-old controversy surrounding [the Seven Year Statute], is at the heart of
the current tension between recording artists and recording companies.”). See also
MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 257-58 (3rd ed. 2003) (“Several major
recording acts, including Metallica, Don Henley, Luther Vandross and the Smashing
Pumpkins, have claimed violation of the seven-year rule in complaints filed against
their record companies in an effort to get out of their recording agreements.”).
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than seven years.”19 This limitation, however, is not applicable
to musicians. Under subsection (b), an artist can notify his
label that he wants to be released from his contract after seven
years, but the label can then sue to recover damages for any
undelivered albums remaining in the contract, a right that is
not available to any other professional services employer.20
Even though section 2855 currently exists only under
California law, its effects are present in other jurisdictions.21
Since most recording contracts are signed in or otherwise made
subject to the laws of New York or California,22 the Big Four,
with offices operating on both sides of the country, have
continued to use a standard form agreement, which includes a
duration provision that is the same in both New York and
California.23 The labels take advantage of the fact that section
2855(b) permits them to sue for damages for undelivered
albums, therefore extending the duration of the agreement for
as long as possible by requiring an unrealistic number of
albums.24
In reality, a recording artist is rarely able to deliver all
the required number of albums under a recording contract in
seven years.25 He is therefore never able to fulfill the terms of
the agreement to leave the record label.26 If the artist tries to
leave the label after seven years, like any other personal
19
See A. Barry Cappello, Old Financial Ways are Over for Record Biz, 21SPG ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 23 (2003).
20
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3).
21
In Radioactive, J.V. v. Manson, 153 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the
agreement between recording artist Shirley Manson and her record label, Radioactive,
was subject to New York jurisdiction, and the contract still obligated Manson to deliver
at least one album, and at the sole option of Radioactive, up to six additional albums.
22
M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC:
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 14 (8th ed. 2000) (“Most recording
contracts are signed in or otherwise made subject to the laws of New York State or
California.”).
23
Id. The only difference that exists between a recording agreement entered
into in New York and one in California is a clause under section 3423 of the California
Labor Code, which requires record companies to pay a guaranteed minimum amount
per year before they can obtain an injunction against an artist attempting to leave the
label while still under exclusive contract. This statute relates to obtaining a court
order barring the artist from recording for another company, but does not affect the
continuing right to sue for monetary damages. This recognizes the fact that it would be
unfair for a label to require an artist to remain under contract if the artist is not
receiving any income. See id. at 15.
24
A. Barry Cappello & Troy A. Thielemann, Challenging the Practices of the
Recording Industry: Recent Lawsuits by Recording Artists Question the Legality of their
Contracts, L.A. LAW., MAY 25, 2002, at 14, 16 (2002).
25
Id. at 16.
26
Id.
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services employee, the label will sue for damages. Recording
artists allege this is a form of “involuntary servitude” because
they are left with no choice but to work or be subject to legal
sanction.27
Whereas section 2855(b) has continued to place artists
in a disadvantaged position for the past nineteen years, the
music industry has changed considerably.28 Music companies
first fought with, but are now slowly accepting, a revolution in
the way music is delivered via digital distribution.29 Today,
record companies are reinventing themselves as full-service
music companies, claiming exclusivity over new media such as
ringtones and voicetones as well as over traditional media such
as film and TV.30 It used to be that the label only acquired the
exclusive right to record an artist during the term of the
agreement.31 New clauses added to today’s recording contracts
provide the label with a portion of the artist’s revenues in all
ancillary activities.32 These provisions, however, deprive the
artists of a substantial amount of income that they never
before shared with the label.33
The changed music industry makes the application of
section 2855(b) more unjust than ever before. Even though the
statute lacks a definition of “damages,”34 record companies
believe they should be able to recover lost profits based on the
“expected profits on the additional albums that artists have
neither delivered nor created.”35 Under the new form of
recording agreements, the record company will likely argue
that it should be able to collect not only expected profits on
album sales, but also expected profits derived from all the new
areas over which they have exclusive rights. This creates the
prospect of enormous damages, and essentially leaves the artist
with no choice but to work even if doing so will require the
artist to perform beyond seven years.
27

Id. (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942-43 (1988)).
See infra Part IV.
29
See id.
30
Owen J. Sloane, Commentary: The Changing Deal, BILLBOARD, Aug. 20,
2005, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file.
31
KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 16.
32
Record labels are “exploit[ing] and expand[ing] their traditional areas of
exclusivity to include such media as ringtones, voicetones, mobile wallpaper,
videogames, film and TV, and other formats that carry music.” Sloane, supra note 30.
33
Charles Duhigg, EMI Is Expected to Unveil New Profit-Sharing Deal With
Korn, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14317222.
34
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17.
35
Id.
28
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This Note argues that section 2855(b) should be
repealed because it permits unconscionable contracts that
impose involuntary servitude.
Part II provides some
background to section 2855, including the history and purpose
of the statute, and the addition of subsection (b). Part III
describes the structure of recording agreements and the
application of section 2855(b) to the music industry in 1987,
when the amendment was adopted. Part IV examines the
relationship between the evolving music industry and changes
in recording agreements. Specifically, it will compare the state
of the music industry and the structure of agreements that
developed from the time the amendment was passed in 1987, to
2000 when digital distribution was introduced. This section
will end with a look at 2005 as record labels expand their areas
of exclusivity. Part V will argue for the repeal of the
amendment. In doing so, this section will demonstrate the
effects of section 2855(b) on the music industry today and
analyze the legal doctrines of unconscionability and
involuntary servitude in connection with today’s recording
agreements. Throughout the discussion, these sections will
examine the record labels’ justifications for keeping the
amendment, and demonstrate how they are now even less valid
than when it was passed.
II.

BACKGROUND OF SECTION 2855

A.

History and Purpose

The United States’ constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude36 laid the foundation for the California
legislature to enact section 2855.
In 1872, California
lawmakers passed legislation to protect against involuntary
servitude in the form of unconscionable employment
agreements.37 The United States Supreme Court has held
involuntary servitude to mean a “condition of servitude in
which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by use or
threat . . . of coercion through law or legal process.”38
Accordingly, an employer cannot force an employee to work for
36

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
Revella Cook, The Impact of Digital Distribution on the Duration of
Recording Contracts, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 42 (2003) (discussing Senator
Kevin Murray’s testimony before the California State Senate in which he explains the
legislative purpose behind the Seven Year Statute).
38
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
37
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him when the work involves services of a personal nature, so
courts refuse to order specific performance of contracts for
personal services.39
The California legislature was concerned with the rights
of large classes of workers whose personal services constituted
These employees were
their means of livelihood.40
contractually prohibited from changing employers or
occupations,41 which was a violation of the principles of
unconscionability. The doctrine of unconscionability protects a
contracting party from harsh and oppressive terms.42
Unconscionability presents itself in two forms: procedural
unconscionability, which relates to procedural deficiencies in
and
substantive
the
contract
formation
process,43
unconscionability, which relates to the contract terms
themselves and whether those terms are unreasonably
favorable to the more powerful party.44
Unconscionable working relationships were common
before the first Civil Code was established in California in
1872.45 Inhabitants of California who did not share the same
freedoms as others, legally or socially, lacked true freedom of
contract and were often forced to work pursuant to harsh and
oppressive terms since there was “little or no enforcement
39

Theresa E. Van Beveren, The Demise of the Long-Term Personal Services
Contract in the Music Industry: Artistic Freedom Against Company Profit, 3 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 377, 385-86 n.26 (1996) (“Many contracts between musicians (or athletes)
and recording or management companies contain a negative covenant ensuring the
entertainer’s exclusivity. At least one court has held that if such a contract is for a
specific period of time, then it should be classified as a contract for personal services.
If, however, the contract has no time limitation, then it should be considered in light of
case law dealing with employment contracts.” (referring to the majority opinion in
Ichiban Records, Inc. v. Rap-A-Lot Records, Inc., No. 01-95-00085-CV, 1995 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1739, at 15 (1st Dist., Aug. 1, 1995))).
40
De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. 1944)
(discussing the legislative intent in passing section 2855).
41
Id.
42
See Anorga, supra note 8, at 772 (“The doctrine of unconscionability is an
extraordinary remedy that should only be used to protect a contracting party from
harsh and oppressive terms.”). See also 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW ON CONTRACTS § 18:8 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2005) (“The
principle [of the doctrine of unconscionability] is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.” (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (2003))).
43
8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 42, § 18:10.
44
Id.
45
Donna R. Mooney, The Search for a Legal Presumption of Employment
Duration or Custom of Arbitrary Dismissal in California 1848-1872, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 633, 634. 648-51 (2000) (discussing the social and economic
environment in California prior to the introduction of the Civil Code in 1872).
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against slavery.”46 This oppressive environment left personal
services employees in a situation where they were waiving
their rights to limit the life of personal services agreements.47
The lawmakers recognized a right of private contract and they
believed that a restriction of such right in this situation better
preserved “public comfort, health, safety, morals and welfare.”
They therefore created section 1980 of the Civil Code, which
later became section 2855 of the California Labor Code.48
B.

Section 2855(a)

California Labor Code section 2855, which is commonly
referred to as the Seven Year Statute,49 prohibits the
enforcement of personal services contracts beyond seven years,
and allows employees in California to terminate contracts after
that period.50 In 1947, De Haviland v. Warner Brothers
Pictures, Inc.51 established the prevailing interpretation of the

46
47
48

Id. at 652.
De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 989 (Cal. 1944).
See id. at 985-88. As enacted in 1872, section 1980 of the Civil Code read

as follows:
A contract to render personal service, other than a contract of apprenticeship,
as provided in the chapter on master and servant, cannot be enforced against
the employee beyond the term of two years from the commencement of
service under it; but if the employee voluntarily continues his service under it
beyond that time, the contract may be referred to as affording a presumptive
measure of the compensation.
In 1931, section 1980 was amended to read as follows:
A contract to render personal service, other than a contract of apprenticeship,
as provided in the chapter on master and servant, and other than a contract
entered into pursuant to the proviso hereinafter in this section contained
cannot be enforced against the employee beyond the term of seven years from
the commencement of service under it;
Exceptional services. Provided, however, that any contract, otherwise valid,
to perform or render service of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or
intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value, the loss of which cannot
be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an action at law,
may nevertheless be enforced against the person contracting to render such
service, for a term not beyond a period of seven years from the
commencement of service under it.
In 1937, the section was repealed and section 2855 of the Labor Code was enacted.
49
See, e.g., Chris Marlowe, Artists, RIAA Plead Cases at “7 Year Statute”
Hearing, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 6, 2001, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR
file; Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 9.
50
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(a) (West 2005); California Labor Code Section
2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, supra note 11, at 2642.
51
153 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1944).
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Seven Year Statute for all personal services contracts.52
Warner Brothers (“Warner Bros.”) signed a contract with
Hollywood actress Olivia de Haviland for a one-year term that
gave Warner Bros., through various option clauses, the right to
extend the contract for up to six successive one-year terms.53
The contract also gave Warner Bros. the right to suspend de
Haviland for “any period or periods when she should fail,
refuse or neglect to perform her services to the full limit of her
ability and as instructed by [Warner Bros.].”54 In connection
with this, Warner Bros. had the right to extend the term for a
time equal to the suspension period(s).55
Warner Bros. suspended de Haviland for a total of
twenty-five weeks over the course of seven years.56
Consequently, Warner Bros. sought to exercise its option and
extend the term of the contract for a time equal to the twentyfive week suspension period, which would have caused the
term of the agreement to last more than seven calendar years.57
Warner Bros. contended that the personal services contract
could be enforced for seven years of actual service.58 The court
rejected this argument and held that section 2855 should be
interpreted as limiting personal services contracts to seven
calendar years.59
In keeping with the purpose of the Seven Year Statute,
the court reasoned that public policy encouraged limiting the
term to seven calendar years to promote economic mobility.60

52
California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2634-35.
53
De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 984.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 985 (“[A] contract for ‘exceptional services’ could be enforced against
an employee for seven years of actual service, even though the employee would thereby
be required to render services over a period of more than seven calendar years.”).
59
De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 986 (“We cannot believe that the phrase ‘for a
term not beyond a period of seven years’ carries a hidden meaning. It cannot be
questioned that the limitation of time . . . was one to be measured in calendar years. It
is conceded that contracts for general services are limited to seven calendar years. The
substitution of years of service for calendar years would work a drastic change of state
policy with relation to contracts for personal services.”).
60
Chang, supra note 8, at 18 (“The court further reasoned that public policy
limited the term . . . because the ability to change employment after that allotted time,
whether to afford a reasonable opportunity to move upward along with increased
skillfulness, or exploit new economic conditions, was highly advantageous to the
employee.”). See also De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 988 (“As one grows more experienced
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As the employee becomes more skillful, he should be able to
seek new employment after the allotted time in order to obtain
the highest compensation.61 The court’s interpretation of
section 2855 created a new “free agency” era for actors.62 The
powerful studios had previously stifled the careers of many
actors by holding them to long-term contracts.63 As a result of
the De Haviland decision, actors gained the power to negotiate
new contracts with different studios and on better terms based
on their true market value.64
Section 2855’s application in the music industry was
markedly different.65 Record labels attempted to avoid the law
altogether by rewriting contracts of disgruntled stars; the
labels offered large cash advances and higher royalty rates in
exchange for more albums.66 Some labels were actually able to
contravene the statute by telling artists that each renegotiation
of a contract constituted a new contract with the “seven-year
clock ticking anew.”67 It was only a matter of time before the
record companies would petition for legislative action, ensuring
their ability to hold a recording artist to an exclusive contract
long after the allotted seven years. In 1987, the Recording
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”)—the influential
trade association representing the music industry68—
successfully lobbied for a proposal that became section
2855(b).69

and skillful there should be a reasonable opportunity to move upward and to employ
his abilities to the best advantage and for the highest obtainable compensation.”).
61
De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 988 (“There are innumerable reasons why a
change of employment may be to [the employees’] advantage.”).
62
See Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9 (“Many
entertainment attorneys say the hearing [to repeal section 2855(b)] was reminiscent of
challenges that eventually brought down the old Hollywood studio system, which
hampered or ruined many actors’ careers by holding them to long-term contracts.”).
63
Id.
64
See California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2635.
65
Chang, supra note 8, at 18-19. (“The application of § 2855 in the music
industry . . . has seen different results. . . . Around 1985, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), the industry’s lobbying arm, launched an attack on §
2855 on behalf of record labels and tried to get the statute extended to ten years.”).
66
Id. at 18.
67
Id. at 18-19.
68
California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2632.
69
Id. at 2636 (“In 1987, after several revisions, the RIAA’s proposal became
section 2855(b).”).
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Exception to the Seven Year Statute: Section 2855(b)

Subsection (b) of the Seven Year Statute requires
recording artists, unlike any other contractual employee
rendering creative, intellectual, or professional services, to
serve written notice of their intent to terminate a contract after
seven years.70 Most importantly, subsection (b) subjects a
recording artist, unlike any other artist under contract, to
lawsuits for damages alleged to flow from the artist’s failure to
deliver the required number of albums during the term of the
contract.71 Essentially, the RIAA was able to exclude recording
artists from the protections offered by the Code.72
In its proposal to the California legislature, the RIAA
argued that the application of section 2855 to the music
industry was unfair for various reasons. First, the law allowed
an artist to breach a recording contract after seven years,
regardless of the artist’s remaining obligations.73 Second,
record companies made large investments in an artist based
primarily on the guarantee that the artist would deliver the
specified number of albums required under the contract.74
Third, the RIAA argued that the primary reason most artists
were not able to record and deliver the required number of
albums in seven years was because the artists themselves were
negligent.75
While artists and attorneys later challenged the validity
of these arguments,76 subsection (b) created an exemption for
70
See Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on the Entm’t Indus., 2001
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Hearings: 2001] (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz,
Director of Sound Recordings, AFTRA).
71
See id.
72
See id. (“The result of this exemption was to effectively lock out recording
artists from the protections offered by the code, rendering the code moot on any
practical level for only one group of individuals—the music makers.” (testimony of
Michael Greene, President & CEO, Grammys)).
73
See Chuck Philips, Company Town; Lawmakers Take Aim at Music
Industry Contracts; Recording: Officials Prepare to Examine What Artists Call the
“Unconscionable” Agreements of the Big Five Conglomerates, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001,
at 1, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file [hereinafter Philips, Lawmakers
Take Aim].
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
In 2001, Senator Kevin Murray (D-Cal.) proposed California Senate Bill
1246 (“S.B. 1246”) to repeal section 2855(b). See Cook, supra note 37, at 42. S.B. 1246
proposed the elimination of the exception for recording artists. This amended version
would have left subdivision (a) of the Seven Year Statute in effect, deleted the
provisions relating to personal services in the production of sound recordings, and
modified the subdivision addressing damages for breaches of recording contracts to
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the record companies that violated the public policy rationale
behind section 2855—to optimize the welfare of employees by
allowing them freedom to seek better employment
opportunities after the allotted amount of time.77 By providing
labels with the ability to sue recording artists for damages
without regard to the Seven Year Statute, the legislature
created a regime under which recording artists found little
The unconscionable provisions of recording
protection.78
agreements only further exposed the artist.
III.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 2855(b) TO A RECORDING
CONTRACT

A.

Structure of the Recording Contract
Congratulations, you got yourself a deal. Beware, making a living
from a business you don’t fully understand can be risky. A large
number of artists, like yourself, including major ones, have never
learned such basics as how record royalties are computed, what a
copyright is, how music publishing works, and a number of other
concepts that directly affect your life. But without understanding
these basics as a foundation, it’s impossible for you to understand

limit the amount that could be recovered. Legislative Counsel’s Digest, S.B. 1246,
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1246_bill_
20020801_amended_asm.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). As originally introduced in
January 2002, S.B. 1246 simply eliminated the damages provision for breaches of
recording contracts, but after the process of negotiating with lobbyists from both sides
took place, the subsequent two parts were added. See Baumgartner, supra note 18, at
83. (“While it seem[ed] . . . that the ideal result for recording artists would be the mere
elimination of the recording artist exception, it seem[ed] equally likely that the
recording companies would so irrepressibly lobby against passage of SB 1246 as to
defeat the Bill entirely.”).
During a series of hearings held by the California Select Committee on the
Entertainment Industry, chaired by Senator Murray, top U.S. recording artists and
labor leaders converged on the state capitol to call on legislators to support S.B. 1246.
Newman, supra note 9. The artists refuted the RIAA’s fourteen year-old arguments,
and were eager to throw a spotlight on the practices of the music industry. Sharp,
supra note 6. Despite a series of high-profile lawsuits and support from top U.S.
recording artists and labor leaders, negotiations between the Recording Artists
Coalition (RAC) and the RIAA failed to produce an agreement. See Melinda Newman
& Bill Holland, Artists Seek Govt. Redress of Contract, Radio Issues: Acts Want Repeal
of 7-Year Statute, BILLBOARD, Feb. 2, 2002 at 1, available at 2002 WLNR 10375838;
Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73; Recording Industry Practices, supra note
17. S.B. 1246 was put on hold and may be revisited in an upcoming legislative session.
Recording Industry Practices, supra note 17. While the bill has not been revisited in
another legislative session as of the writing of this Note, the possibility is still very
strong because this is an issue that must be solved by the legislature.
77
Chang, supra note 8, at 21.
78
See California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2642.
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the intricacies of your professional life. And as your success grows,
and your life gets more complex, you’ll become even more lost.79

Because of the high failure rate of released albums,80
record companies absorb great losses on most albums, and thus
insist that they must earn profits from the few successful acts
on their rosters.81 The standard industry contract, then, is
typically structured around a business model that allows labels
to extract much of their earnings from the handful of
blockbuster albums each year.82 Some of the devices used by
the labels include minimum recording requirements with
additional options, recoupable artist advances, and exclusive
rights over the artist’s creative output.83 All of the major
contract clauses described in this section continue to exist in
agreements today even though the numbers have changed
slightly.84 More importantly, however, is taking into account
how the structure of agreements evolve, and how those changes
affect the application of section 2855(b).85
Recording agreements set forth a minimum number of
albums that the artist must deliver to the record company
during the contract term.86 At the time the amendment was
passed, companies typically insisted on one firm album

79
Adaptation based on DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
MUSIC BUSINESS 3 (1st ed. 1991) [hereinafter PASSMAN, 1st ed.]. Throughout this
section the footnotes sometimes cite the first edition of Donald Passman’s book. The
first edition is referred to because it provides a more accurate look at the way recording
agreements were structured around the time subsection (b) was passed, specifically the
numerical figures of deal terms (i.e. advance monies, royalty percentages). The general
concepts of advances, royalties, and the like remain the same in recording agreements
today, however, and therefore, the discussion of these provisions are supported by
citations from both versions of the book as a method of comparison.
80
See Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, Director of
Sound Recordings, AFTRA). In Ann Chaitovitz’ testimony, she recounted singer Sheryl
Crow’s experiences. Crow did not receive any money until after her record had sold
three or four million copies, demonstrating that it can take two or three years for an
artist to become successful and actually receive a royalty payment. Ann stated that “in
1999, nearly 39,000 recordings were released, but only 3 singles and 135 albums—
0.35%—were certified as selling three million units [reaching a level of recognizable
success].” Id.
81
California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11 at 2638.
82
Philips, Recording Stars Challenge, supra note 9.
83
See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
84
See infra Part IV.A & B for a description of the changes that occurred from
the time the amendment was passed to today.
85
Part V of this Note asserts that the application of section 2855(b) in today’s
record industry leads to even more harsh results.
86
KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 17.
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obligation with options for seven to nine more.87 For each
album, the artist receives an advance of monies, from which he
pays all costs to produce the records and gets to keep any
remaining portion as pre-royalty compensation.88 When the
RIAA successfully lobbied for the amendment, a new artist
typically received an advance of $175,000 to $250,000, whereas
a mid-level recording artist may have received an advance of
up to $400,000.89 The advance for a top-selling artist could rise
to more than $500,000.90 Although these advances may seem
substantial, they are quickly consumed by the costs necessary
to release an album, including recording, video production,
marketing and promotion costs.91
87
See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 91. A label, however, is not
required to release every album that an artist is committed to deliver. The agreements
contain a record company’s commitment to record and distribute only one album (a
“firm album”) from the artist and option clauses that, if exercised by the company,
require the artist to record and deliver additional albums (“options” or “option
albums”). See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 14; PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra
note 79, at 91; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 100. The company therefore
commits itself to the smallest obligation it can negotiate, while keeping the option to
demand as much product as possible. PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 91; PASSMAN,
5th ed., supra note 12, at 100. Further adding to the one-sidedness of the agreement,
after the initial album is released, the record company has the option of “dropping” the
musician if he has not generated profits, or is no longer marketable. Philips:
Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73.
88
See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 85-89; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra
note 12, at 80; GARY STIFFLEMAN & BONNIE GREENBERG, Exclusive Recording
Agreements Between An Artist and A Record Company, in 8 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
CONTRACTS ¶ 159.03, at 159-17 to 159-18 (Donald C. Farber ed., 1986); Cook, supra
note 37, at 41.
89
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 85. In the first edition of his book,
Donald Passman distinguishes artists as follows: New Artist: an artist that has never
signed a record deal, or an artist that has been signed but never sold over 150,000
albums per release; Midlevel Artist: an artist whose last album sold in the 200,000 to
500,000 range; Superstar: sales from 750,000 and up. He acknowledges that these
categories are rough approximations, as there are many variables. Id. at 82.
90
Id. at 85.
91
See Downs et. al, Sound Recordings and Music Videos, in COUNSELING
CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, 311 PLI/PAT 11, 13-14 (1991) [hereinafter
Sound Recordings and Music Videos] (Recording costs of up to $250,000, promotion,
advertising and initial production of up to $300,000, and additional costs of
distribution). In addition, the record company charges the artist 50% of video costs, to
create music videos, and 100% of independent radio promotion costs, to get the songs
played on the radio. Cook, supra note 37, at 41. In addition to a specific list of
recoupable items (like cash to the artist, recording costs, and video costs), almost every
contract has a general provision that says all amounts “paid to you or on your behalf, or
otherwise paid in connection with this agreement” are recoupable unless the contract
specifically provides otherwise. PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 76; PASSMAN, 5th
ed., supra note 12, at 82.
In late 2005, payola payments made by record labels to get songs played on
the radio made headlines again after some label executives were discovered bribing
programmers to play songs by certain artists. “An investigation led by New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer into pay-for-play schemes resulted in Sony-BMG
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These expenses are all charged against the artist’s
royalties.92 Royalties are the percentage the artist receives on
records sold.93 A newly signed artist in the late eighties
typically received a royalty of eleven to thirteen percent.94
Established artists could usually negotiate a higher royalty
rate.95 An artist will not see a penny of these royalties,
however, until the label recoups the entire advance and all
other chargeable expenditures associated with the release of
the album.96 Because advances are non-returnable, if an artist
does not sell enough records to recoup the full amount of the
advance, the record company loses that amount.97 It is this
major loss that labels use in defense of their business practices
that artists so often label as “unfair.”98 A label can, however,
cross-collateralize the loss against future royalty streams.99
Therefore, if an artist delivers his first album, but does not
recover the full advance, the deficit from the first album would

making a $10 million settlement and the Warner Group paying another $5 million.”
Steve Morse, Amid Industry Troubles Some Sterling Moment, Live 8, Stones and U2
Shows Stood Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 2005, at N7, available at 2005 WLNR
21064330. The focus then turns to the question of whether or not the labels will
continue to charge these independent promotion costs to recording artists even though
the practice has been labeled as “illegal” and “deceptive.” Amanda Bronstad, Facing
the Music: Debatable Point: Tough Stance may not Halt Tradition of Payola, L.A.. BUS.
J., Dec. 5, 2005, at 14, available at 2005 WLNR 22007369.
92
In Courtney Love’s cross complaint, it was argued that “[i]n addition to the
unworkable theoretical delivery schedule, the Agreement effectively required the artist
to incur production and other costs, recoupable against advances, which virtually
guaranteed little financial return for most artists and monumental profits for the
record company.” Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 7.
93
See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 19; PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra
note 79, at 62-73 (discussing royalty calculations); PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at
68-79 (same).
94
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 83.
95
See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 19. A midlevel artist
typically received a royalty of 14-16%. A superstar artist could receive anywhere
between 16-20%. PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 83.
96
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 74-79; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12,
at 80-84.
97
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 77; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at
82.
98
California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2638 (“Because of the high failure rate of released albums, however,
record companies absorb great losses and thus insist that they must earn profits from
the few successful acts on their rosters.”). See supra note 9 and accompanying text for
a listing of artists who argue that their contracts are unfair.
99
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 78-79; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12,
at 83-84.
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be recouped from the earnings of the second album in addition
to the advance for the second album.100
As an additional incentive to underwrite the enormous
costs of developing an unknown artist’s career, record
companies acquire the exclusive right to record an artist during
the term of the recording agreement.101 Traditionally, this
simply meant that the artist could not make records for
anybody else—it did not prohibit the artist from appearing on
television, in a motion picture, or on the radio as long as the
artist did not grant the use of his recordings for phonograph
record purposes.102
Various other contractual provisions—the work-for-hire
clause, the controlled composition clause, and numerous
discounted royalty provisions—continue to be the source of
rigid disagreement amongst those in the legal and music
communities.103 While no American court has ever held a
100

PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 78-79; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12,

at 83-84.
101

See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 27, at 16.
See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 119-23; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra
note 12, at 132-37; Sound Recordings and Music Videos, supra note 91, at 37-39.
103
Anorga, supra note 8, at 754. These provisions include:
102

(1) The work-for-hire clause, which allows the labels to become the owners, or
authors, of the sound recordings that the artist produces under that
contract—this means the artist loses all rights and control in how the song
will or will not be exploited by the record label. See Holland, Performers Give
Testimony, supra note 9; Future of Music Coalition, Major Label Contract
Clause Critique 2-3, Oct. 3, 2001, http://www.futureofmusic.org/
contractcrit.cfm [hereinafter Contract Clause Critique] (last visited Sept. 22,
2006); see also PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 240-42; PASSMAN, 5th ed.,
supra note 12, at 276-79.
(2) The controlled composition clause, which puts a cap on how much money
an artist can earn for musical contributions in the form of mechanical
royalties (monies paid by a record company for the right to use a song in
records). See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 185-91; PASSMAN, 5th ed.,
supra note 12, at 209-19; Anorga, supra note 8, at 765-66 (discussing the
controlled composition provision); Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra
note 9; Contract Clause Critique, supra, at 6-7.
The Copyright Office sets the statutory rate for mechanical
royalties, increasing every two years according to changes in cost of
living as determined by the Consumer Price Index. . . . The first
rate increase was in 1981. It was at about this time that the
Controlled Composition clause became commonplace in record
contracts.
See Contract Clause Critique, supra, at 6.
(3) Discounted foreign and record-club sales provisions, which provide that an
artist will receive a discounted royalty for the sale of his music in these
formats. See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 132-51 (discussing advanced
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standardized music contract unconscionable,104 it is hard to
deny the one-sidedness of these agreements. The record
companies stand firm in their position, however, that they take
huge risks investing extensively in unproven artists, and
therefore need to capitalize on those artists who achieve
success.105 Undeniably, labels do spend enormous amounts of
money with no guarantee that they will see any return on that
investment.106 Leaving the successful artists bankrupt and in
debt to their record labels, however, is not a just way to make

royalty computations); PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 151-73 (same);
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. Record club sales are a
substantial source of income for record labels, more than $1 billion in 2001.
The record clubs actually pay hundreds of millions of dollars in up-front fees
to record companies in order to have the rights to sell their artists’ CDs, but
the labels neither disclose nor include these fees when calculating artist
royalties. Courtney Love Sues UMG Recordings Charging Violation of
California Labor Code, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 28, 2001, available at LEXIS
News Library, USPAPR file [hereinafter Courtney Love Sues].
(4) “Phony” free goods clauses, which provide that the record company does
not have to pay the artist a royalty on records that are not “sold.” As a result,
if a company gave a retailer fifteen free records for every eighty-five
purchased, the artist did not receive a royalty. However, today, few
companies actually give away fifteen percent of the records they ship, yet still
don’t pay artist royalties on these records. See PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note
79, at 67-69; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 72-74; Holland, Performers
Give Testimony, supra note 9.
(5) Breakage royalty deductions, which dates back to the days when shellac
records (which haven’t been manufactured since 1975) arrived broken at the
retailer, and therefore labels passed on the cost of damage to the artist. See
PASSMAN, 1st ed., supra note 79, at 71; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at
77; Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.
(6) New technology deductions allowed labels to deduct up to twenty-five
percent from the artist’s royalty for the development of CDs. See PASSMAN,
1st ed., supra note 79, at 138-40; PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 88-91;
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.
104

Anorga, supra note 8, at 740.
See Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. On the Entm’t Indus., 2002
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (statement of Hilary Rosen, President and CEO, Recording
Industry Association of America) (“The only reason record companies can risk
investment in the new artists and absorb losses from failures is because, when
successful artists make it, money goes back into the system.”).
106
See Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1 (discussing one failed act
that received a $750,000 advance, which was allocated to cover the cost of recording its
first album and to provide the group with about $250,000 to live on after deducting
legal and management fees. The company invested an additional $2.8 million to roll
out a marketing campaign to reach retail stores, radio, music TV networks, and
another $1.2 million for retail product placement, tour support, photo shoots,
advertising and radio and TV show appearances to boost the CD. The album sold only
100,000 copies and the label dropped the act after losing more than $2.7 million on the
project.).
105
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up for these losses. The application of section 2855(b) allows
just that.107
B.

Application of Section 2855(b)

Problems arise from the dissonance between the
quantity-based requirements of the standard recording
contract and the temporal requirements of the Seven Year
Statute.108 Labels assert that an artist can easily deliver one
album a year, and therefore can deliver seven albums within
the statutory time period.109 When an artist is forced to
promote records via tours, music videos, and television
appearances, however, this makes the labels’ proposed delivery
schedule almost impossible to meet.110 All these additional
activities can extend the time period between albums to two
years.111 In effect, section 2855(b) permits record labels to
extend the duration of a recording agreement to fourteen years
or more; because of this, the labels have no reason not to
demand seven or more albums.112
107
Marlowe, supra note 49 (“The nonprofit Future of Music
Coalition . . . submitted a detailed written analysis of standard recording industry
contracts. ‘We are submitting this critique here as a means to shed light on the majorlabel working environment, which leaves an estimated 99.6% of artists in debt to their
record labels.’”).
108
California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2641 (“The combination of contract terms based on the number of
albums delivered and the amendment of section 2855 to include 2855(b) in effect
shifted the problems associated with the unanswered questions to the artists. The
problems arose from the dissonance between the temporal requirements of section 2855
and the quantity-based requirements of the standard recording contract, the duration
of which is defined by an album delivery requirement . . . .”).
109
See Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9 (“Answering
questions from lawmakers about whether the number of albums contractually
requested by labels can be delivered in seven years, MCA’s [senior VP of business and
legal affairs, Mark] Goldstein [sic] gave a list of artists, such as Reba McEntire, who
can consistently deliver an album every year.”).
110
See Chang, supra note 8, at 16-17:

Since no artist is able to turn out seven albums within seven years,
considering the restrictions put on them by the labels to take two years
between record releases to promote the record via tours, music videos, and
television appearances . . . such quotas allegedly threaten to lock recording
artists into personal service contracts for at least fourteen years, twice as
long as the statutorily allotted time period [for other artists under contract].
Id.
111
See, e.g., Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 6 (“[R]ecord companies
have preferred and often insisted on a minimum two-year gap between releases for
artists.”); Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17.
112
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16 (“When artists sign the
industry standard contracts, no one expects them to deliver seven albums in seven
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In addition to effectively allowing record labels to
demand long-term recording agreements, section 2855(b)(3)
purports to allow damages if an artist gives notice of
termination under section 2855(a).113 The damages provision of
section 2855(b)(3), however, is unclear.114 Although neither the
statute itself nor any case law defines “damages,” record
companies argue that the courts should equate damages with
lost profits.115 Back when labels were granted exclusive control
over recordings only, the record company could base damages
solely on sales from these recordings.116 Under the theory of
lost profits, a record company would have been entitled to
recover the expected profits on the additional albums that an
artist had yet to deliver when he breached the contract.117
In awarding damages on the lost profits theory, the
court would be required to make a calculation of the future
worth of a contract.118 Recovery of damages for lost profits
depends on three questions: whether the defendant’s conduct
was the proximate cause of the damages; whether the damages
were foreseeable as a probable result of the breach at the time
the contract was made; and whether the damages can be
Assuming a record
proven with reasonable certainty.119
company will easily be able to meet the proximate cause and
forseeability prongs, the label will still need to prove that it
would incur damages with “reasonable certainty.”120 The courts
years, yet the industry uses the threat of speculative lost profits under Section 2855(b)
to force an artist to produce seven albums even if doing so will require the artist to
perform beyond seven years.”).
113
Section 2855(b)(3) states:
In the event a party to [a recording contract] is, or could contractually be,
required to render personal service in the production of a specified quantity of
the phonorecords and fails to render all of the required service . . . the party
damaged by the failure shall have the right to recover damages for each
phonorecord as to which that party has failed to render service in an action.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2005).
114
See California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2642; Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 84; Cappello & Thielemann,
supra note 24, at 17.
115
See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17.
116
KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 16. See infra Part V.B for a
discussion on the application of subsection (b) in today’s music world where the label
earns revenue from more than just sales of recordings.
117
KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 22, at 16.
118
Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 412.
119
See 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS §§ 1.1,
1.4, 1.8 (4th ed. 1992).
120
California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2644.
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have held that “if plaintiff’s proof leaves uncertain whether
plaintiff would have made any profits at all, there can be no
recovery.”121
The record company would attempt to prove with
certainty the future profitability of the artist with evidence of
number of records sold, profits on past record sales, the
popularity of the artist, and other indicators of success.122
While all this data would help the court assess the future
profits a company expects to earn from record sales, nothing in
the music business can be predicted with certainty.123 A hit
record in the past does not guarantee similar sales in the
future; often, artists are simply one-hit wonders.124 A popular
group with many successful albums may not be able to create
another album whose numbers match past sales figures.125 For
example, unforeseen personality or substance abuse problems
could surface.126
121
Id. (quoting 1 ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS
§§ 1.1, 1.4, 1.8 (5th ed. 1998)). See also Kids’ Universe v. In2labs, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
158, 169 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Lost anticipated profits cannot be recovered if it is uncertain
whether any profit would have been derived at all from the proposed undertaking
(quoting S.C. Anderson, Inc. v. Bank of America, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 289 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
122
Id. at 2647 n.109 (“The record company would put on evidence such as past
record sales, increasing rates of sales, critics’ record reviews and predictions of
popularity, plans for future touring and the revenue gained or lost by touring,
testimony about the quality of marketability of partially completed songs and albums,
stability and longevity . . . .”).
123
Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 412. As an example of the difficulty
inherent in calculating lost profits, what if Alanis Morissette decided to leave her
record label after seven years but still owed the company four more albums? It is
unclear whether the company would be allowed to base the value of damages on her 30million selling hit, “Jagged Little Pill,” or her follow-up, “Supposed Former Infatuation
Junkie,” which sold just 2 million copies. Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73.
124
For an in-depth look of all the one-hit wonders from the ‘50s to the ‘90s,
visit http://www.onehitwondercentral.com. Some of the most played songs of all time
were originally performed by artists that were never heard from again: The Penguins,
“Earth Angel”; The Bobbettes, “Mr. Lee”; The Monotones, “The Book of Love”; Bobby
Day, “Rockin’ Robin”; Devo, “Whip It”; Sugar Hill Gang, “Rapper’s Delight”; Bow Wow
Wow, “I Want Candy”; Toni Basil, “Mickey”; Dexy’s Midnight Runners, “Come On
Eileen”; House of Pain, “Jump Around”; the list goes on and on. Id.
125
Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 412.
126
Id. One-time pop diva, Whitney Houston, whose albums were certified
seventeen, thirteen and nine times platinum, entered a drug treatment rehabilitation
center in early 2004 to deal with her years of rumored drug abuse. See Recording
Industry Association of America, Gold & Platinum Searchable Database: Whitney
Houston, http://www.riaa.com/gp/database/ (search “Whitney Houston”) (last visited
Sept. 22, 2006); César G. Soriano, Whitney Houston Enters Drug Rehabilitation Center,
USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2004, at 01D, available at 2004 WLNR 6255933. The RIAA
defines a “platinum album” as one million units sold. Recording Industry Association
of America, Gold & Platinum, available at http://www.riaa.com/ gp/default.asp (last
visited Sept. 22, 2006).
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Even “successful, established artists are subject to the
same uncertainties that face the average artist.”127 Some of the
most successful artists of all time have been unable to maintain
past record sales. For example, Michael Jackson, the biggestselling solo artist of all time, literally shattered sales records.
Two of his albums, Off the Wall and Dangerous, reached a
status of seven times platinum, Bad had sales of eight times
platinum, and Thriller, which holds the title of best-selling
album in history, was certified twenty-six times platinum.128
However, in 2002, Jackson’s album Invincible was certified
only two times platinum,129 a number that fell far short of his
past sales records.
In addition to the inherent market
uncertainties, it is completely speculative for record companies
to assume that over the next twenty years they would actually
exercise each and every one of the remaining options.130 Given
the emotiveness of the various factors that can affect future
lost profits, courts should not get involved with determining
such an incalculable number.131
Even if a court was able to devise a fair and workable
method for the calculation of lost profits, the outcome would
become even more onerous for the artist. Because a record
company’s profit on a single album typically exceeds the
royalties that the artist earns, the lost profits a record company
purportedly suffers would exceed whatever royalty the artist
would earn under a new record deal.132 Artists who breach
their contracts would be free to sign with a new record label,
but would never see a dime since they would owe their previous
record company more money in alleged lost profits than they
would earn in royalties from their new record contract.133 The
127

California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts,
supra note 11, at 2647.
128
Recording Industry Association of America, Gold & Platinum Searchable
Database: Michael Jackson, http://www.riaa.com/gp/database/ (search “Michael
Jackson”) (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
129
Id. As another example of the unpredictability that affects all artists,
Mariah Carey’s self-titled album Mariah Carey was certified nine times platinum,
Music Box and Daydream were both certified ten times platinum, while Glitter sold
only one million albums. Recording Industry Association of America, Gold & Platinum
Searchable Database: Mariah Carey, http://www.riaa.com/gp/database/ (search “Mariah
Carey”) (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
130
See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17.
131
Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 413-14 (“It is important to recognize that
determining the value of an artist’s contract is not synonymous with judging artistic
merit. Courts have been extremely unwilling to judge a performer’s quality.”).
132
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 17.
133
Id.
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artist would also owe financial commitments to her new record
company, thus the artist’s royalties would be paid to both her
old record label and her new one.
Faced with these dismal prospects, few artists choose to
terminate their contracts under section 2855(a).
Many
recording artists that attempted to litigate the issue in court134
alleged that the issue of “damages” imposes involuntary
servitude, which exists because they have “no available choice
but to work or be subject to legal sanction.”135 While these
artists most definitely had a strong argument, at least they
could still rely on ancillary revenue streams for additional
income. At this time, recording agreements only granted the
labels control over recordings and merchandising; therefore, an
artist being sued for damages could still bring in revenue from
commercial endorsements, merchandising, music publishing,
and acting deals.136 This would quickly change, however, as the
industry evolved and record companies began to demand more
control over an artist’s creative works.

134
Several artists have sued their labels over contract disputes. See Holland,
Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9, at 1, 4, 5. The list of artists that have sued
their labels include: Prince, the Beatles, the Beach Boys, Sammy Hagar, L.A. Reid,
Teena Marie, Kenny Rogers, Donna Summers, Barry White, Meat Loaf, the Eagles,
Metallica, Oscar de la Hoya, Luther Vandross, Toni Braxton, Beck, Bone Thugs-NHarmony, the Bellany Brothers, ‘N Sync, Bush, New Edition, the Goo Goo Dolls, TLC,
Dr. Dre, Blondie, the heirs of Buddy Holly, Blink-182, and various others. Id. at 5.
Two of the most publicized cases, involving Dixie Chicks and Courtney
Love, focused national attention on the Seven Year Statute—the artists battled their
labels over undelivered albums and payments of royalties. Baumgartner, supra note
18, at 81. Both cases challenged the “legality of many provisions of record contracts in
that most artists have little or no negotiation power, and that the contracts are
onerous, unconscionable, a restraint of trade, and are even criminal.” See Holland,
Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9, at 4. In both cases, the parties agreed to
settle before going to trial. Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 81. A settlement is typical
for lawsuits between an artist and her record company for several reasons. One reason
is that artist attorneys have no desire to change the climate created by unfair contracts
and unhappy clients. Another is that companies would rather settle a complaint than
be involved in lengthy litigation. See, e.g., Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra
note 9; Philips & Morain, Company Town; Measure on Music Contracts Planned;
Entertainment: State Senator Says He’ll Challenge Statute that Ties Recording Artists
to Years-Long Contracts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, available at LEXIS News Library,
USPAPR file.
135
See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16 (citing United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942-43 (1988)).
136
Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1.
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IV.

EVOLUTION OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY AND RECORDING
AGREEMENTS

A.

2000: Digital Distribution
Well, there’s a lot of smart people at the music companies. The
problem is, they’re not technology people. . . . And so when the
Internet came along, and Napster came along, they didn’t know
what to make of it. A lot of these folks didn’t use computers—
weren’t on e-mail; didn’t really know what Napster was for a few
years. They were pretty doggone slow to react. Matter of fact, they
still haven’t really reacted, in many ways.137

In 1999, an eighteen year-old college dropout, Shawn
Fanning, developed an idea that drove the music industry
mad.138 Fanning and “an Internet chat-room friend, founded
Napster, a peer-to-peer file sharing service that enabled its
users to trade and share music files for free over the
Internet.”139 At the same time, major record labels experienced
an economic downturn.140 The number of units shipped in the
United States decreased by about ten percent from 2000 to
2001, which led to a decrease in sales of about $600 million.141
This was also the first time the recording industry experienced
a decline in CD sales since 1994—units shipped decreased by
137
Adaptation based on Jeff Goodell, Steve Jobs: The Rolling Stone Interview,
ROLLING STONE, Dec. 3, 2003, http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/_/id/5939600.
138
Joseph A. Sifferd, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis of
the Rapidly Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 93 (2002).
139
Id. at 93. Even though the Ninth Circuit determined that Napster violated
existing copyright law and Napster consequently shut down, various other file-sharing
websites emerged, such as Morpheus, Grokster and Kazaa. See Schorr, supra note 6,
at 77-78. On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that file-sharing
companies, such as Grokster and Morpheus, can be held liable when promoting theft of
copyrighted materials. While this decision was a “win” for the record labels, analysts
predict the ruling will have little impact on the availability of illegally downloaded
music and movies. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005); Sarah Rodman, And the Beat Goes On . . . Analysts See Little Impact of
Court’s Downloading Ruling, BOSTON HERALD, June 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
10175860.
140
Schorr, supra note 6, at 68. (“Major record labels [were] floundering for
their economic survival.”). See also id. at 72-73 (“The major labels are experiencing an
economic downturn. The number of recordings shipped in the United States from
record companies to retail outlets . . . fell 10.3% in 2001, and more than 15% over the
last two years. . . . Globally, the value of the international music market plunged 5%,
and unit sales dropped by 6.5% in 2001. Industry insiders estimate that between 5,000
and 10,000 music industry employees have been laid off, and many established
recording artists have been discharged by their labels.” (footnotes omitted)).
141
Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Association
of America’s 2004 Yearend Statistics, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/
pdf/2004yearEndStats.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
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seven percent and dollar sales decreased by two percent.142
Record label executives blamed the poor record sales on
increased online piracy through file-sharing websites.143 They
fought vigorously to conquer the Internet by suing the online
competition for appropriation of their copyrighted music and by
creating their own subscription services.144
As the industry began to change drastically, standard
provisions in recording agreements changed as well, but not as
one might suspect.
Ten years prior, after the CD was
introduced, “any record company with a library suddenly
became a ‘cash cow.’”145 Labels were in the mode of “spend big
to sell big,” and recording agreements began to reflect this
growing wealth.146 A new artist typically received an advance
of $175,000 to $300,000, whereas a mid-level recording artist
may have received an advance of up to $600,000, twice of what
an artist in the late eighties would receive.147 The advance for a
top-selling artist could rise to more than $1,500,000, over $1
million more than thirteen years prior.148 Labels insisted on a
total of five to seven albums over the course of a deal, instead
of the eight to ten options they used to require twenty years
before.149 A new artist that entered into a recording agreement
in 2000 typically received a royalty of anywhere between
142

Id.
Schorr, supra note 6, at 73. “The music industry had never experienced a
decline of this magnitude.” Steal This Song; Go Ahead and Burn That MP3. The Music
Biz Will Thank You Later, SCENE ENT. WKLY., Nov. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR
13301184 [hereinafter Steal This Song].
144
Schorr, supra note 6, at 75-76.
145
Phil Gallo & Meredith Amdur, Time to Face the Music: Mergers, New
Owners, Piracy Reshaping Tune Biz, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 9, 2003, available at 2003
WLNR 10942868.
146
Id. (“With an eye cast more toward marketshare to impress shareholders
than toward artist development to attract musicians, the industry moved to a model in
which only bigger was better. That paved the way for free-spending on hype and
marketing that focused on only the most commercial of recordings.”). Record labels say
they are still suffering from a spate of expensive deals negotiated during the middle
and late 1990s. Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1.
147
PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93. See also supra note 89 and
accompanying text. In the fifth edition of his book, Donald Passman distinguishes
artists as follows: New Artist: an artist that has never signed a record deal, or an artist
that has been signed but never sold over 250,000 albums per release; Midlevel Artist:
an artist whose last album sold in the 750,000 to 1,500,000 range; Superstar: sales
from 2,500,000 and up. PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 87. These sales criteria
are much larger than those in the eighties, and reflect the success that the industry
experienced during the nineties with the advent of the CD. See supra note 89.
148
PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93. See also supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
149
PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93. See also supra notes 86-87 and
accompanying text.
143

746

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2

thirteen to sixteen percent of the suggested retail list price, a
definite improvement from the eleven to thirteen percent he
used to receive years ago.150
While the terms of the newer agreements may have
appeared more favorable to the artist, labels actually added to
the oppression of artists by introducing new provisions to make
up for the losses they were experiencing after the introduction
of digital downloads. One such provision was the packaging
royalty deduction, which provided for deductions of up to
twenty-five percent off the artist’s royalty to pay for label
development of digital electronic transmissions, future digital
downloads, upkeep of Websites, and expanding label Internet
presence.151 In addition, the labels were able to maintain new
technology royalty deductions of up to twenty-five percent. In
the eighties, labels justified these deductions for the
After the introduction of online
development of CDs.152
distribution, labels defended the deductions to make up for the
costs involved in such new configurations as digital compact
cassette, DVD-Audio, and audiophile records.153 In effect, these
provisions procured the artist’s money for the label.154
150
PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 93. See also supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
151
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9.
152
Id.
153
Id. Essentially, “the modernization of product formats and manufacturing
processes [was] at least partly charged against artists’ recoupment accounts.” Id.
154
For example, if a new artist received a royalty of fourteen percent, an
eighty-five percent rate on CDs (new technology deduction), a three percent producer,
recording costs of $300,000, and tour support of $50,000, his or her royalty for sales of
500,000 albums looked something like this:

Suggested Retail Price

$18.98

Less: Packaging (25%)

-4.74

Royalty Base
Royalty Rate (14%, less 3% for the producer [11%] x
85% for CD [9.35%])
Royalty
Royalty x 500,000 units

$14.24
x 9.35%
$1.33
x 500,000
$665,000

Less 15% “free goods factor”

-99,750
$565,250

Less: Recording Costs

-300,000
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With the label receiving a greater share of revenues by
reducing the artist’s royalty, the record companies’ arguments
in defense of section 2855(b) became even less valid.155 In 1987,
recording industry lobbyists told lawmakers that labels did not
earn a profit on their successful artists until the fourth album,
and therefore they would be severely injured if the artist did
not deliver the remaining three albums.156 This argument may
have had some validity twenty years ago, when the recording
industry was based on development.157 Back then, labels
nurtured their artists and focused on developing long-term
According to then-deputy president of EMI
successes.158
Recorded Music, Roy Lott, it was not until artists Kenny G. and
Sarah McLachlan were on their fourth albums and into the
fifth year of their contracts that they started to experience
success.159
By the beginning of the century, however, labels had
shifted their focus to creating immediate superstars. If an
artist’s record did not immediately succeed, the record company
did not exercise its option and it dropped the artist.160 Labels
could no longer claim that the reason they needed to be
exempted from the Seven Year Statute was because they
needed to “develop” the artist.
Nonetheless, the record
companies continued to operate under the protection of
subsection (b). As a result, an artist being sued for breach of
contract would be liable to the label for an even larger amount
of damages since lost profits would include these monies that
rightfully belonged to the artist but that the label now claimed.
Less: 50% of independent promotion

-100,000

Less: 50% of video costs

-75,000

Less: tour support

-50,000

TOTAL

$40,250

Calculations adapted from PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 98.
155
See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
156
See Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73.
157
Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (statement of Michael Greene, President &
CEO, Grammy’s, discussing the differences in relationships between artists and labels
in the 1980’s and today, and drawing attention to the fact that artists used to be
developed and nurtured by the labels whereas today using the word “relationship” may
be completely inappropriate, given the lack of its existence).
158
Id.
159
See Newman, supra note 9.
160
Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, Director of
Sound Recordings, AFTRA).
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As labels soon realized that digital distribution was here to
stay, they quickly found novel ways to secure for themselves a
larger share of the artist’s profits.
B.

2005: Expanding the Rights of Labels in the Music
Industry
Shawn Fanning turned twenty-five in late November of this year,
and it’s been a very long seven years since he wrote a little computer
program that let him trade electronic music files with his dorm
mates. He called it Napster, and it quickly grew into an Internet
phenomenon, not to mention the music industry’s bête noire until
the courts shut it down four years ago.
Now the spotlight is turning back to Mr. Fanning, this time as a
symbol of how big business and the disruptive force of the Internet
just might find a way to get along. By year-end, Grokster, a new file
sharing service will appear—this one sanctioned by the record
industry because it will use technology that requires file-swappers to
pay for copyrighted material.161

In the few years since the introduction of digital
distribution, the music companies have finally caught on. They
are starting to embrace the idea that peer-to-peer file-sharing
services can be reconstituted as legal sales outlets.162 Album
sales, however, are still not what they used to be. Sales are
thirty percent below their level the year Napster was let loose,
and ten times as many songs are illegally downloaded from file
sharing services as are bought from paid services like Apple’s
iTunes.163
Nonetheless, labels have started to accept the new
business models presented by innovative media such as
downloads, subscriptions, and ringtones.164 As the Web quickly
replaces traditional forms of music distribution, label
executives and artist managers are frequently at odds over how
to slice up these new “money pies.”165 Labels are fighting to

161

Adaptation based on Saul Hansell, Putting the Napster Genie Back in the
Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18734374.
162
Id. (“Apple Computer and other companies have built thriving,
unquestionably legal music-downloading businesses.”).
163
Id.
164
Antony Bruno, Video Booms Online—But for Whom? Explosive Demand for
Clips Sparks Renewed Debate on how Artists Should Share the Wealth, BILLBOARD,
Oct. 29, 2005, available at LEXIS News Library, USPAPR file [hereinafter Bruno,
Video Booms Online].
165
Id. Ringtones are a good example. Bernie Lawrence-Watkins, Esq.
describes a ringtone as:
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obtain the largest possible portion of the revenues attributed to
digital downloads, video downloads, ringtones, and ringbacks.166
In addition to these novel revenue streams, labels are
exploiting and expanding their traditional areas of exclusivity
to include areas that used to belong to the artists: videogames,
film, and TV.167 Labels are trying to muscle their way into all
these additional revenue streams by adding non-negotiable
provisions to the standard recording agreements that require
artists to share these ancillary revenues with the label.168
Record companies are even requiring currently signed artists to
accept amendments to their existing agreements that grant the
label the exclusive rights to these new media.169 Fred Davis, a
prominent music entertainment attorney, points out that:

a portion of a song embodied in a digital file and rendered into audio.
Ringtones allow you to customize the sound your mobile phone makes when
you receive a call.
Ringtone providers license the sound
recordings/compositions from music labels and publishers, reformat the
song—usually in 30 second formats—for mobile phone use and stores the
format on their database.
Dennis M., 7 Questions with Bernie Lawrence-Watkins, Esq.; A Backstage Pass to the
Music Industry, ATLANTA TRIB., July 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14596030.
When ringtones first arrived on the cell phone market, artists and their
mangers ignored them, doubting any real revenue could come from cell phone rings.
Bruno, Video Booms Online, supra note 164. Now that the industry is worth $3 billion
globally, some artists feel that ringtones should yield a licensing rate of 50%, instead of
what most get: a royalty rate, generally 10-20%. See Bruno, Video Booms Online,
supra note 164; Lawrence-Watkins, supra note 165. Analysts predict that this is a
market that will continue to grow. As full-track ringtone downloads stabilize around a
$1.50 price point, the lucrative realtone (ringtones that sound more like online digital
music downloads because of the vocals and the improved voice quality) market
currently charges around $3 to $3.50. The Specialist Role of the Aggregators, MUSIC
WK., Sept. 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14921366. See also Bruno, Video Booms
Online, supra note 164.
166
Artists typically receive a thirteen percent royalty on record sales before
any royalty deductions, which then leaves the artist with a royalty of around nine
percent. See supra Part III.A. With digital downloads, artists receive an even smaller
eleven percent royalty, based on the standard 99 cent price before any deductions.
Bruno, Video Booms Online, supra note 164.
In addition to digital downloads, labels are claiming a stake in online video
download receipts. In mid-October of this year, Apple announced that it would expand
its à la carte model to sell music videos. Id. Some labels have started charging for
access to their video libraries on America Online and Yahoo. Id. Theses sites have
shown explosive growth in video demand online—Yahoo streamed 3 billion music
videos in 2004, and now averages about 350 million music videos per month. Id.
Labels now charge about $1.40 per video, and pay the artists a royalty percentage. Id.
Artists and their lawyers contend that the video sales should be counted as a license
instead of a royalty, which would increase the artist share to fifty percent of the fee.
Id.
167
Sloane, supra note 30.
168
Id.
169
Personal experience/interviews subject to confidentiality.
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Right now the issue of distribution of digital income isn’t on the
radar of most artists. However, when you combine the projected
income in 2006 from ringtones, digital downloads, subscriptions and
video income, it’s going to become an ever-increasing portion of artist
revenue. The battle lines need to be formed right now.170

Record companies defend these new exclusive rights by
arguing that they are not trying to control an artist’s ability to
exploit her music in other formats, they only want to share in
the income derived from an artist’s activities in other media.171
Agreements used to require only that artists promise not to
make records for anyone else.172 Activities in other media—TV,
webcasting, or film—were untouched, and the artist was able
to profit from those activities, owing nothing to the record
company as long as the recordings were not part of a motion
picture soundtrack.173 Under the new deal terms, however, a
recording artist may not, without record company approval,
and presumably, financial involvement, appear in a TV show,
webcast, or motion picture unless the role is completely
unrelated to the artist’s endeavors as a musician.174 These new
agreements only add to the unconscionability of the artists’
situation because artists have lost control over the ability to
convert their musical fame into other financial opportunities.175
As one example of today’s revised agreements, EMI
recently signed an agreement with the rap-metal band Korn,
which gives EMI a stake in almost every dollar the band will
earn worldwide over at least the next five years.176 EMI will
pay the four-member band an estimated $15 million upfront—
more than twice what the band might expect from a traditional
recording contract. In return, EMI will get more than twentyfive percent of the band’s publishing, merchandising, and
touring revenue, as well as profits from the group’s albums.177
Artist managers and attorneys are concerned about these deals
that appear to favor the artists, because in reality, they deprive
the artists of a substantial part of their income.178 They
170

Bruno, Video Booms Online, supra note 164.
Sloane, supra note 30.
172
Id. See also notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
173
Sloane, supra note 30.
174
Id.
175
Id. (“[R]ecord companies are trying to secure a bigger piece of the artist’s
pie without paying or adding anything extra.”).
176
Duhigg, supra note 33.
177
Id.
178
Id.
171
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maintain that musicians rely on concerts and licensing
contracts for as much as seventy percent of their income.179 It
used to be that recording artists could “earn millions of dollars
from concerts, commercial endorsements, merchandising,
music publishing and acting deals, none of which they share[d]
These new agreements render the
with their labels.”180
application of section 2855(b) even more disastrous for the
artist than ever before.
V.

ARGUMENT TO REPEAL SECTION 2855(b)

A.

Application of Section 2855(b) to the Music Industry
Today

As labels transform themselves from vendors of physical
goods to licensors of digital media, label executives, artist
managers, and attorneys will continue to fight over how to slice
up ancillary revenues.181 Given their command of the entire
recorded music industry, it is hardly surprising that the record
labels are quickly gaining control over new revenue streams as
well as traditional revenue channels that once belonged solely
Even if the record companies were to
to the artist.182
compensate the artists fairly, the issue remains that in the
past artists typically relied on these activities as financial
opportunities that were untouched by the label.183
Under this new contract model, the artists have even
more reason for dissension as the legal effects of applying
section 2855(b) are revealed.184 Under the lost profits theory, it
used to be that a record company would be entitled to recover
the expected profits on the additional albums that the artist
had not yet delivered.185 Although subsection (b) provides for
damages for phonorecords,186 which at the passing of the
amendment only existed in the form of vinyl, cassettes, and

179

Id.
Philips, Record Label Chorus, supra note 1.
181
Antony Bruno, The Future of Music: Industry Transformation is Just
Getting Started, BILLBOARD, at 33, Dec. 3, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 19575250
[hereinafter Bruno, The Future of Music].
182
See supra Part IV.B.
183
See supra notes 136, 178-80 and accompanying text.
184
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
185
Id.
186
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2005).
180
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CDs,187 U.S. copyright law defines phonorecords as sounds fixed
in any method that existed in 1976 or that were later
developed.188 Therefore, under today’s recording agreements, a
label recovering for breach of contract will also claim the new,
additional, and rapidly growing revenue streams that fit within
the definition of phonorecords as damages.
This problem is aggravated by the nature of today’s
industry. With the push for one-hit wonders and instant
successes, labels may be bringing in more revenue on a new
artist within the first few months of an album release due to
ringtones, ringbacks, and video download sales than they used
to make on a successful artist after two or three albums.189
Because the labels contend that an artist’s future worth is
based on past profits,190 after just one semi-successful album
and additional sales through supplemental revenue streams, a
label may be able to claim millions of dollars in damages.
While the application of section 2855(b) was plainly
unfair when it was passed, at least an artist being sued for
breach of contract back then could rely on other financial
Today,
opportunities such as film, TV, and licensing.191
however, an artist is not only liable for a practically unlimited
amount of potential lost profits, but she has also lost the
opportunity to exploit and expand on her creative works.
Therefore the artist is left penniless. Faced with such bleak
prospects, an artist is left in a situation whereby she is subject

187
See Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry
Association of America’s 1999 Yearend Statistics, http://www.riaa.com/news/
newsletter/pdf/2004yearEndStats.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
The yearend
statistics from 1990 only include sales figures for CDs, cassettes, and vinyl records. It
was not until 2004 that the RIAA included sales figures for digital formats. See
Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Association of
America’s
2004
Yearend
Statistics, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/
2004yearEndStats.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
188
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). U.S. Copyright law defines “phonorecords” as
“material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Id.
189
Record Biz Taking Hits on All Sides, VARIETY, June 27, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 11655954.
PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that consumer music
spending will rise 8.3% between 2004 and 2009, and “at least 6% of that increase will
be created by purchases of digital downloads and mobile music.” Id. See also supra
note 170 and accompanying text (quotation of Fred Davis, projecting the everincreasing amount of income that ringtones, digital downloads, subscriptions and
videos will bring in).
190
See supra Part II.C.
191
See supra notes 136 and 175 and accompanying text.
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Unconscionability and Involuntary Servitude in Music
Contracts Today: An Analysis

The California legislature originally enacted the Seven
Year Statute to protect against involuntary servitude in the
form of unconscionable agreements.192 Within the last twenty
years, courts have been more willing to apply the doctrine of
unconscionability to protect contracting parties in the
entertainment industry from harsh and oppressive terms in
contracts.193 The doctrine has yet to be applied to the duration
of a recording agreement.194 In determining whether a contract
is unconscionable, courts will look for the presence of
procedural unconscionability, which exists when one party
lacks meaningful choice in entering a contract or negotiating
its terms, and substantive unconscionability, which exists
when the terms are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.195 Some courts require a showing that the contract was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when
made.196 However, some courts have held that “substantive
unconscionability may be sufficient in itself even though
procedural unconscionability is not.”197 Other courts have
indicated that a sliding scale applies.198
In determining whether a contract is unconscionable,
and thus unenforceable under law, California courts apply a
sliding scale test. 199 The more substantively oppressive a
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability
is required to come to the conclusion that the term is

192

See supra Part II.A.
Anorga, supra note 8, at 747 (“An increasing amount of cases involving the
entertainment industry have been litigated within the last twenty years, and courts
have appeared more willing to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to protect
contracting parties from harsh and oppressive terms in contracts.”).
194
See id. at 759-63 (discussing whether the lengths of standardized music
contracts would be considered unconscionable by a court in California).
195
See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint
and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 472 (1995) (“Most successful
[unconscionability] claims involve a combination of procedural and substantive
unconscionability, but it is debatable whether both elements must be present.”).
196
8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 42, § 18:10.
197
Id.
198
Prince, supra note 195, at 472.
199
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1128, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003).
193
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Even though record
unenforceable, and vice versa.200
companies have traditionally taken advantage of artists’
ignorance, inexperience, lack of involvement, and lower social
status,201 a musician signing a contract with a major record
label is probably represented by a competent individual (e.g.,
manager, agent, or attorney).202 Therefore, a court is unlikely
to find much evidence of procedural unconscionability in a
recording agreement.
On the other hand, a court may hold that same
agreement to be full of provisions that fit the definition of
substantive unconscionability.203 The various contract clauses
that deal with duration, ownership of recordings, recoupment
of advances, and artist royalties are inherently unfair,204
especially in light of the free agency status that other creative
artists enjoy under the Seven Year Statute.205 Instead of
protecting recording artists from unconscionable agreements in
the same way it does for film actors and athletes, the Seven
Year Statute only further exposes musicians by allowing labels
to keep an artist under contract for well beyond the statutory
limit, a most unfavorable result for the artist.206 Country singer
LeAnn Rimes, for example, signed a recording deal when she
was twelve years old, agreeing to deliver twenty-one records in
seven years.207 Rimes has pointed out that she will probably be
working under the contract until she turns thirty-five because
the standard schedule of recording, touring, and promotion,
makes it practically impossible for an artist to deliver an album
a year.208 As a result, she can never leave her label.
As the court in De Haviland pointed out, there are
“innumerable reasons” why signing with a new label after a
reasonable period of time may be to a recording artist’s
200

Id. at 1148.
Van Beveren, supra note 39, at 381-82 (quoting Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F.
Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
202
Anorga, supra note 8, at 756.
203
Id.
204
See supra Part III.A.; Anorga, supra note 8, at 772.
205
See Anorga, supra note 8 (discussing why musicians think their contracts
are unconscionable); Love Cross Complaint, supra note 13, at 2; Marlowe, supra note
49 (“This statute is unconstitutional because it singles out the record industry. These
contracts are unconscionable, signed by entry-level artists who mostly have no power.”
(quoting music attorney Don Engel)); Courtney Love Sues, supra note 103 (referring to
Courtney Love’s cross complaint).
206
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 19.
207
Sharp, supra note 6.
208
Id.
201
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advantage.209
The court stated, “[a]s one grows more
experienced and skillful, there should be a reasonable
opportunity to move upward and to employ his abilities to the
best advantage and for the highest obtainable compensation.”210
Every artist engaged in rendering personal services enjoys the
equitable compensation and creative freedom provided by the
Seven Year Statute, except for contemporary music artists.211
There is little difference between recording agreements,
such as LeAnn Rimes’, and the contracts the California
legislature was trying to prohibit when it passed the Seven
Year Statute. The threat of damages an artist faces under
subsection (b), however, creates exactly the opposite result. It
essentially forces recording artists into involuntary servitude.212
By seeking excessive damages in a suit against an artist, the
recording company is able to use the threat of enormous, lost
profit damages to force an artist to produce the remaining
albums even if doing so will require the artist to perform
beyond seven years.213 Knowing that she will be liable for
millions of dollars, the artist will have no choice but to work.
Any artist who attempts to avoid involuntary servitude
by breaching her recording agreement is faced with a lack of
alternate revenue streams upon which artists before her could
rely.214 This makes involuntary servitude inescapable because
the artist—now liable for profits from ringtones, ringbacks, and
video downloads in addition to record sales, and no longer in
control of these supplementary revenues—will have even less
of a choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction because of
the potential for exaggerated damages. As recording artist Don
Henley said even before the new agreements, “We aren’t free to
compete
in
the
marketplace.
We’re
talking
Only by repealing the
about . . . indentured servitude.”215
amendment can the legislature preclude a result that forces the
artist into involuntary servitude.

209

De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct.

App. 1944).
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16.
Baumgartner, supra note 18, at 79-80.
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 16.
Id.
Marlowe, supra note 49.
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Repealing Section 2855(b)

Section 2855(b) permits record labels to take part in
practices that conflict with the doctrines of unconscionability
and involuntary servitude. By allowing the labels to sue for
breach of long-term recording agreements, section 2855(b)
assists in the creation of unconscionable duration periods and
helps force the artist into involuntary servitude with the threat
of damages. Record companies with vast resources may
continue to press for settlement in important cases they fear
they may lose to keep these issues safe from judicial review.
For these reasons, the California legislature should repeal
subsection 2855(b).
Of course, an artist should not be able to just walk away
from a contractual agreement—it would be disastrous for a
company to lose the millions it invested in a new artist.216 This
is not what artists are asking for; they are simply asking that
they be treated like every other creative artist that is subject to
the Seven Year Statute. Recording artists and their supporters
argue that the television and film industries are similar to the
recording industry in that they all require large financial
investment in projects.217 Contrary to the film industry,
however, the record industry then holds a recording artist,
unlike any other creative artist, liable for future profits that
may cover the span of fourteen or more years,218 twice the limit
imposed by the statute.219
216

Cook, supra note 37, at 43. One spokesperson for the RIAA argued that:

Artists can’t just get a pass on this issue. There is not going to be sympathy
for them when they take multimillion-dollar advances from the companies
and then just walk away before they fulfill the obligations in their contracts.
Somebody has got to come up with the money to cover damages that the
companies incur.
Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73. Some label executives go so far as to
suggest that a change in the law would “jeopardize the record company’s ability to earn
profits from its agreements and run a viable business with successful California-based
artists.” Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. History has proven to the
contrary. After the holding in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944), and the demise of the studio system in the film industry, the
industry actually got bigger. The “economic freedom for creative people is just good
business.” Courtney Love Sues, supra note 103 (quoting A. Barry Cappello).
217
Hearings: 2001, supra note 70 (“[T]here is nothing unique about the preproduction costs associated with the phonorecord industry. Artists working in other
fields, such as film . . . also often require substantial advances, investment and
promotion of the artist over the course of several years and several projects . . .”)
(testimony of Anne Chaitovitz, Director of Sound Recordings, AFTRA).
218
Holland, Performers Give Testimony, supra note 9. Anne Chaitowitz,
pointed out that the “film industry’s companies have lived with the seven-year law with
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If the California legislature repeals subsection (b),
recording artists would be able to enjoy the same rights as all
There would be a reasonable
other creative artists.220
opportunity for them to receive fair-market compensation for
their services,221 which is one of the major policy reasons behind
the Seven Year Statute.222 This same law which has created
oppression over recording artists has created immense
opportunities for other creative artists, including film actors
and athletes.223 Free agency has resulted in enormous wealth
for these individuals, and the film and sports industries have
prospered even as employee salaries have risen in accordance
with true market value.224 More than ever before, recording
artists, who have lost control to convert their creative works
into other financial opportunities and who are subject to
unconscionable recording agreements, need the protections of
section 2855(a). Repealing the amendment is the only way to
uphold the original purpose behind the Seven Year Statute.
VI.

CONCLUSION
The laws here are still evolving (and will be for years), as they try
mightily to adapt themselves to new technologies that arrive hourly.
And any time you have a concept created in 1909 being applied to
things that weren’t even conceived at the time, you create a healthy
fund to put lawyers’ children through college.
So, where’s the good news? Well, we’re learning there’s still a very
strong desire for music. We just haven’t figured out how to harness
it for the forces of good instead of evil.225

no such amendment for nearly two decades [and], ‘They haven’t gone anywhere, have
they?’” Id. (her response to suggestions that if the law changed, record companies
might not only sign fewer artists in California, but might also move to another state).
219
Both artists and their attorneys point out the differences in the treatment
of recording artists and that of all other creative artists. Don Henley asked, “How can
everybody else be protected but us?” Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim, supra note 73. A.
Barry Cappello, Courtney Love’s attorney, argued that, “We’re really just trying to
follow the trend of the law and create the same kind of business opportunities for the
musicians and record companies that the end of the studio system created for the film
business and that free agency created in baseball.” See Courtney Love Sues, supra note
103.
220
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 19.
221
Id.
222
See supra Part II.A.
223
Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 24, at 19.
224
Id.
225
PASSMAN, 5th ed., supra note 12, at 372-79.
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The California legislature enacted the Seven Year
Statute to protect against unconscionable agreements that
impose involuntary servitude. The record industry’s efforts to
avoid a law under which an artist could walk away from an
agreement after seven years led to the creation of subsection
(b). By allowing the record label to sue an artist for breach of
an agreement, the amendment effectively permits record
companies to operate in ways that are contrary to the purpose
of the Seven Year Statute.
Faced with the threat of millions of dollars of lost profits
damages, back then, an artist essentially had no choice but to
work or be subject to legal sanction. At least an artist that
breached a recording agreement twenty years ago could rely on
other financial opportunities, such as TV, film, and licensing,
for a substantial portion of income. This is no longer true in
today’s music world where record labels demand to share in
these ancillary sources of revenue. The new agreements, which
grant the label exclusivity over new and traditional methods of
distribution, provide an even stronger reason why recording
artists should be protected by section 2855(a).
Nonetheless, record labels still enjoy the protections of
subsection (b). As a result, artists who wish to leave their
record labels to seek better terms will be liable for a greater
amount of damages and will not be able to rely on ancillary
revenue streams as alternative sources of income. In effect,
unconscionability and involuntary servitude are more
prevalent than ever before.
For these reasons, the California legislature should
repeal section 2855(b). Only then will recording artists be able
to enjoy the same rights that all other creative artists enjoy
under the protection of the statute. Only then will the Seven
Year Statute be able to return to its original purpose of
protecting one’s natural liberty.
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